Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Since Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) , economists have generally accepted the proposition that, in an environment in which expectations converge to fully rational, the natural rate of unemployment represents the threshold to which a central bank can permanently reduce unemployment without accelerating inflation. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000) , hereafter ADP, have proposed that some agents form "nearly rational" inflation expectations, a behavioral assumption whereby agents either underweight inflation (only incorporate a fraction of it) when making decisions or, in the extreme, they ignore it altogether. Further, as the economic incentive to anticipate inflation varies from agent to agent, the proportion of nearly rational agents in the economy is an inverse function of inflation, producing a "kink" in the long-run Phillips curve below the natural rate of unemployment (see figure 1, which reproduces the long-run Phillips curve derived by ADP from their theoretical model). The mechanism by which this kink is produced is as follows: At zero inflation, rational as well as nearly rational individuals expect no inflation, which makes actual inflation equal to expected. As inflation rises above zero, the nearly rational agents underestimate inflation, and thus overestimate their real wage increases, work more, and thereby drive down unemployment. However, as inflation rises, some of the agents that were nearly rational at lower inflation rates find it worthwhile to start predicting inflation accurately and thus switch to forming rational inflation expectations. As a consequence, as inflation increases, a smaller proportion of households form nearly rational expectations, which tends to push their unemployment in the opposite direction. The interaction of these two effects suggests that unemployment is minimized (employment is maximized) at a low, but nonzero rate of inflation. In the ADP model, the natural rate of unemployment is merely a special case of the sustainable long-run unemployment rates, in which either the rate of inflation is zero or so high that all agents find it advantageous to make decisions using rational inflation expectations. The authors stop short of providing precise estimates of the inflation rate that minimizes unemployment and, indeed, they "resisted the temptation to call the unemployment-minimizing rate of inflation the optimal rate." 1 The welfare implications of the ADP model are not perfectly clear since, via the efficiency wage assumption, productivity also varies with the rate of inflation. Further, the wedge between actual and perceived real wages that causes an unwitting substitution between labor and leisure needs to be evaluated relative to the distortions created by wage and price frictions in the model. But subsequent discussion by ADP is less cautious, and they state that "Zero 4 inflation is an inappropriate policy target [of the central bank] because it raises the sustainable rate of unemployment by a significant amount.
[…] Moderate inflation, which includes the range of [U.
S.] experience of recent years, with the core CPI rising at a 2 to 2.5 percent annual rate, allows the economy to operate with low unemployment.
Such an inflation rate yields maximum prosperity."
2 Whether it provides a prescription for an optimal inflation rate or not, the ADP model gives a rationale for why a central bank might target inflation at a moderately positive level, which, in practice, virtually every central bank with an inflation target has chosen to do. 3 The existence of nearly rational agents as described in ADP implies that a central bank must produce a modest inflation if the minimization of unemployment is among its long-run objectives.
In this paper we test whether the assumption of near rationality conforms to households' inflation expectations as measured by survey data. We find that these data fail to reveal the correspondence between nearly-rational agents and inflation, as suggested by ADP. However, we document that the inflation expectations of both U.S.
and Swedish households are clearly qualitative in nature, and that, during the period of inflation targeting in Sweden, a disproportionately high proportion of Swedes ignore inflation when the CPI has been held close to the Riksbank's inflation target of 2 percent.
Despite a nearly identical inflation performance, no such pattern is revealed in the U.S.
data. This observation suggests that the way the central bank communicates its inflation objective may influence inflation expectations independently of the inflation trend it actually pursues.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we first revisit the evidence presented in ADP in support of nearly-rational inflation expectations, and question whether these tests provide evidence in favor of their specific form of near-rationality.
We then demonstrate that direct measures of inflation expectations, as recorded by survey data, are generally unsupportive of the specific form of near-rationality suggested by ADP. However, the detailed survey data, examined further in section 3, reveal an intriguing "qualitative" pattern in the inflation expectations of households. We evaluate the detailed U.S. and Swedish survey data across alternative inflation regimes and document what appears to be one form of "near-rationality" in inflation expectations akin to that proposed by ADP. Finally, section 4 concludes.
The Evidence of Near-Rational Inflation Expectations
In this section, we bring the theory of nearly-rational inflation expectations to the data. We first review the evidence in favor of near rationality, as presented in Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000) for the United States, and Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) for Sweden. We argue that their methodology and data is unable to distinguish their specific form of near-rationality from other forms of less-than-fully-rational inflation expectations. To test the specific form of near-rationality suggested by ADP, we therefore use detailed survey data on households' inflation expectations in the United States and Sweden.
Re-Examining the Evidence In Favor of Near-Rationality
To test the near rationality hypothesis, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry estimate Phillips curves of the following general form using U.S. data,
where π is realized inflation, e π is expected inflation formed at some earlier date (typically, one year ago), and u is the unemployment rate. 4 Equation (1) is estimated in two subperiods, high inflation, where the five-year inflation trend exceeds 4 percent, and low inflation, where the inflation trend is less than 3 percent, or, alternatively, less than 2.5 percent. For each subperiod, they specify equation (1) using different lag structures, and use alternative measures of inflation, inflation expectations, and the unemployment rate. Inflation is measured as the annual percent change in the CPI, the GDP deflator, or the PCE deflator, expected inflation is taken from the University of Michigan's Survey of Consumer Attitudes or the Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters, and unemployment is measured as the rate for all workers, the rate for 25-to 54-year old males, or as Shimer's (1988) demographically adjusted series. 5 The alternative specifications of the high-and low-inflation samples and the different lag structures, combined with the different measures of inflation, inflation expectations, and the unemployment rate yield a total of 144 alternative estimated price equations for each sample (see figure 2, which reproduces the high-and low-inflation βs estimated this way by ADP.) ADP find that while the constellation of the estimated βs is approximately unity in the high-inflation sample (mean = 1.00), it is significantly less than one in the low-inflation sample (mean = 0.25). This finding is consistent with their near-rationality hypothesis as it shows that only a fraction of aggregate expected inflation enters the 7 estimated Phillips curve equations in the low-inflation sample, while in the high-inflation sample, aggregate expectations are fully incorporated into the estimated equations. Having found evidence consistent with the near-rationality hypothesis, ADP turn to the long-run Phillips curve. Using a nonlinear representation, ADP approximate their model using a variety of alternative "right-hand side" variables. Regarding the inflation rate that minimizes long-run unemployment, ADP conclude that "the densest cluster of estimates spans a range from 1.5 to 3 percent for the inflation rate that maximizes employment in the long run. The estimated unemployment reduction from operating the 8 economy at that inflation rate (rather than at zero or high inflation) falls mainly in the range from 0.5 to 3 percentage points." 6 Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) follow the approach used by ADP to estimate a long-run, expectations-augmented Phillips curve for Sweden. When survey measures of inflation expectations are used, they find that the unemployment-minimizing rate of inflation is about 4 percent, compared to Sweden's current inflation target of 2 percent. In Lundborg and Sacklén (2003) , the authors show that under the conditions laid out by ADP, the minimization of unemployment is likely to be welfare maximizing. If Sweden were to raise its inflation target to 4 percent, the authors claim, unemployment would be permanently reduced from 4 to 2 percent, output would rise, and effort would decrease.
Of course, the fact that the estimated β in equation (1) drops below unity in a lowinflation environment is not a direct test of near-rationality but merely the observation that the covariance of actual and expected inflation (given the cyclical state of the economy) falls relative to the variance of inflation expectations, and this may be true for a number of less-than-fully-rational expectation assumptions. As an example, suppose that a fraction of the population expects an inflation rate that on average equals the central bank's long-run inflation target and the remainder form rational expectations.
Suppose further that if observed inflation remains close to the target, the central bank gains credibility and a rising proportion of agents expect the central bank to deliver the stated objective. Under such an expectations formation, a β less than unity would also be observed if one estimates equation (1) in the low-inflation sample, whereas β would be unity in the high-inflation sample. As a matter of fact, any expectations scheme where a 9 part of the population hold expectations centered around any constant is consistent with the findings in figure 2.
As the method and data used by ADP and Lundborg and Sacklén are unable to distinguish between their specific form of near-rationality from other, less-than-fullyrational inflation expectations formations, we follow the approach suggested by The model used by ADP to derive the long-run Phillips curve contains no dynamics, making direct tests of near-rationality virtually impossible. As an example, suppose that the economy is hit by a transitory shock to the inflation rate, making the inflation rate increase temporarily. Should such a shock induce the nearly rational agents to start forming rational inflation expectations, or does a change in behavior require that the shock have persistent effects on the inflation rate? As the ADP-model provides no guidelines on what triggers a change in behavior, we proceed along two paths. We first identify different inflation "regimes" in the two countries. This approach only requires that, to be consistent with ADP near rationality, a change in the expectations formation occurs when the economy switches from one inflation regime to another. We also look at all available data, which implies that the expectations formation is consistent with ADP near rationality if every change in inflation induces a change in the expectations formation in accordance with the near-rationality hypothesis.
To identify the different inflation regimes in the two countries, we conducted BaiPerron (1998) break-points tests on the U.S. CPI and the core CPI in Sweden. 11 , 12 These break-points are shown in figure 3 together with the average inflation rate between two break dates, henceforth referred to as the "inflation trend." The tests reveal that both nations experienced two break-points in our data, yielding three distinct inflation regimes. The regimes are remarkably similar for the two countries. In the United States, the first inflation break is estimated between July and August of 1982, when the inflation trend drops from 10.2 to 3.9 percent. The second break occurs between January and February of 1991, when the inflation trend falls to 2.7 percent. In Sweden, the first break in the inflation data is estimated between the December of 1983 and January of 1984 as the inflation trend drops from 9.6 percent to 6.0 percent. The second break occurs between March and April of 1991, when the inflation trend is reduced to 2.5 percent.
Sweden announced a formal inflation target in January 1993, but at the time of the introduction of inflation targeting the inflation rate had already fallen substantially. Thus, our test picks up a break prior to the announcement of inflation targeting. Note that since the early 1990s, the United States and Sweden have followed nearly identical low-12 inflation paths, regarding actual as well as trend inflation, after having formerly followed higher trends. 6.0%
3.9% 2.7%
2.5%
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistics Sweden, and own calculations. Notes: The inflation trends refer to the average inflation rate between two break dates, where the break dates are identified by the Bai-Perron (1998) break-point test.
Regarding the difference between expected and actual inflation, near-rationality implies that household inflation expectations errors should correspond to inflation in a nonlinear way: At zero inflation there is no difference between those who ignore inflation and those who are fully rational. Hence, the aggregate (the average across households) expectations error should be zero at price stability. In a low, but nonzero inflation environment, however, as some fraction of individuals continues to ignore inflation while the rest form their expectations rationally, the ADP-model predicts that, aggregate inflation expectations are less than realized inflation. As inflation continues to rise, a larger proportion of the population form their expectations in a fully rational way, so that 13 the aggregate expectations error, eventually, shrinks as the added accuracy of the rational agents more than offsets the increasingly negative expectations errors of the nearlyrational. Eventually (at very high inflation), the ADP framework assumes everyone is fully rational and the aggregate expectations error tends to zero again.
Our first test of near-rationality therefore amounts to computing the average aggregate expectations errors across the different regimes, and checking whether these expectations errors correspond to inflation in such a nonlinear way. In We quickly note that in the United States, aggregate inflation expectations errors are, on average, relatively small (about 8 percent of the realized inflation rate), and positive. This is somewhat problematic, since rational expectations argues that these average aggregate errors should be zero, and near-rationality implies that they should be negative (non-positive). However, a large number of studies have found a positive "bias" in mean survey data for the United States when the benchmark for comparison is an aggregate consumer price index. 13 In other words, U.S. survey data on household inflation expectations are typically higher than the officially reported CPI-measures. As reported earlier, these survey data do not record household predictions of any particular inflation statistic, but rather the growth rate of "prices in general," leaving ambiguous the benchmark against which respondent accuracy should be judged. 14 To compensate for any potential benchmark error, we focus on the differences in the expectations errors across the three regimes. In the United States, as inflation is reduced from about 10 to about 4 percent, households switch from under-to overpredicting inflation. As inflation is reduced further, from about 4 to about 3 percent, U.S. households overestimate inflation even more. That average aggregate inflation expectations errors in the United States increase as inflation is reduced is a strong contradiction of the ADP near-rationality hypothesis.
In Sweden, households' inflation expectations roughly coincide on average with realized inflation. However, as inflation is reduced from about 10 to about 6 percent, households switch from under-to overestimating inflation, and, as inflation is reduced further, from about 6 to 2.5 percent, households again start underpredicting inflation.
While the behavior of aggregate expectations errors across the last two regimes in Sweden is broadly consistent with ADP near-rationality, the general, "inverted U-shape" observed across all three regimes is hard to reconcile with near-rationality.
13 A recent study of this "bias" is Mehra (2002) . 14 Bryan and Venkatu (2001b) analyze, among other things, the responses in the FRBC/OSU Inflation Psychology Survey and show that about 66 percent of the interviewed households had heard of the CPI. While those 66 percent gave very accurate estimates of what had happened to the CPI, their average response to the question about "prices in general" was more than twice as high as the increase recorded by the CPI. This finding suggests that whatever price measure households have in mind when they answer the question about "prices in general," it is probably not the CPI.
As argued earlier, it is not clear from the ADP-model whether a transitory increase in inflation should cause the nearly rational households to start forming rational expectations or if the increase must be more persistent to induce a changed behavior. In 
where e π is aggregate expected inflation from the survey twelve months ago, and π is the inflation rate. If ADP-type near-rationality holds, we expect to find 0 = In the first two rows we see the results from the Michigan survey. Aggregate expectations errors tend to be about 3 percent at zero inflation. As argued before, a significant constant in the U.S. data need not be evidence against near-rationality.
Consistent with ADP-type near-rationality, we find that the coefficient on the inflation rate is of the expected sign and significant, but the coefficient on squared inflation, while having the expected sign, is not significant. In the case of Sweden, consistent with ADPtype near-rationality, aggregate expectations errors are not significantly different from zero at price stability. However, neither the coefficient on inflation nor the coefficient on squared inflation is significant or of the expected sign, which is fairly strong evidence against ADP-type near-rationality.
In figure 4 we show the expectations errors for the U.S. data, together with the fitted values from equation (2) Overall, we find evidence of the ADP near-rationality thesis lacking in the aggregate data. The relationship between errors in household inflation expectations and inflation does not correspond to the model's prediction. However, a complete evaluation of the ADP model requires a more careful examination of behavior of the individual household inflation predictions, a topic to which we now turn.
Evidence of Near-Rationality in the Micro-Data
A key implication of the near-rationality hypothesis is that when inflation is below some threshold, some individuals underpredict inflation, or, in the extreme, they ignore it altogether. The lower the inflation rate the greater is the proportion of households that underpredict or ignore inflation. A simple test of near-rationality would therefore be to check whether the proportion of households that ignore or underpredict inflation is inversely related to inflation. However, before doing that we need to address the evidence that households hold very different expectations about inflation.
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In terms of the ADP-framework, allowing for heterogeneous responses from the proportion of households that form rational expectations implies that we no longer know whether a household that expects no inflation belongs to the nearly-rational or rational proportion of the population. Also, if we allow for heterogeneity among the rational individuals it seems plausible that the fraction of zero responses among the rational individuals increases when inflation falls. We would therefore expect the fraction of 15 That households hold heterogeneous inflation expectations is documented in, e.g., Jonung (1981) , Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) , and (2001b), Carroll (2003) , Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) , Souleles (2004) , and Palmqvist and Strömberg (2004) . From the early work on survey measures of expectations, it is clear that the causes of heterogeneity in inflation opinions are important to consider when testing the assumption of rational expectations formation. See, e.g., the discussion about rationality in survey measures between Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) and (1983) and Kimball and Joines (1983) . Keane and Runkle (1990) provide further insights on this note. The fact that households form heterogeneous inflation expectations is, however, something that must be considered when testing any hypothesis about expectations formation.
households expecting no inflation to vary inversely with inflation even in the case where all agents form rational expectations.
Near-rationality combined with heterogeneity of responses among rational individuals therefore implies that the test for near-rationality must be modified. As inflation falls, there will be more nearly-rational households expecting no (or underpredicting) inflation, and there will be a greater proportion of rational households expecting no inflation. In the extreme case, where nearly-rational households ignore inflation, the fraction of households expecting no inflation should thus vary nonlinearly with inflation in order to be consistent with near-rationality. In the case where the nearlyrational individuals underpredict inflation, ADP near-rationality only requires that the fraction of households underpredicting inflation varies inversely (i.e., not necessarily nonlinearly) with inflation. In table 3 we show the fraction of households expecting no inflation, and the fraction of households underpredicting inflation in the full sample and the three regimes. 
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In the United States, there are on average 18 percent of the respondents that expect no inflation over the next year, and 54 percent of the respondents underpredict inflation on average. As we go from one inflation regime to another, the proportion of households expecting no inflation is almost unaffected, whereas the proportion of households underpredicting inflation falls with the inflation trend. Thus, irrespective of which form of near-rationality we are considering (ignoring or underpredicting inflation), these findings are inconsistent with near-rationality. If anything, table 3 suggests that, counter to near-rationality, more households underpredict inflation at high rates of inflation.
In Sweden, the proportion of households expecting no inflation increases as inflation is reduced from about 10 to about 6 percent, and it increases substantially as inflation is reduced further, which is consistent with the predictions of the extreme version of ADP where the nearly-rational individuals ignore inflation. The substantial increase in the proportion of households expecting no inflation is also associated with a rise in the proportion of households underpredicting inflation. The only evidence against ADP in the case of Sweden is that the proportion of households underpredicting inflation falls by almost 20 percentage points when Sweden goes from the first to the second inflation regime.
Looking at the full data set, we regress the fraction of households expecting no, or underpredicting, inflation on the rate of inflation with the simple, nonlinear form,
where f is the fraction of households expecting no, or underpredicting, inflation, and π is the inflation rate. We expect to find Notes: Standard errors using the Newey-West procedure are shown within parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Table 4 shows that, in the United States, there is no relation between the proportion of households expecting no inflation and the actual inflation rate. Regarding the proportion of households underpredicting inflation, we find that both the coefficient on inflation and the coefficient on squared inflation are of the wrong sign and significant.
For Sweden we find that both the fraction of households expecting no inflation and the fraction of households underpredicting inflation conforms with the predictions of nearrationality.
Figures 6 and 7 show the fraction of households expecting no inflation over the coming year as a function of the realized inflation rate in the United States and Sweden, respectively. We have also included the estimated relationship from table 4 in the figures.
In the U.S. data, there is no relationship between the realized rate of inflation and the 22 proportion of households predicting price stability. Thus, our findings for the U.S. in table 4 are robust to the simple quadratic functional form we assume in equation (3). We also see that the results are much different in the HIP data for Sweden. Clearly, the proportion of Swedish households predicting no inflation jumps, and substantially so, when the realized rate of inflation falls below 3 percent. Thus, the behavior of the proportion of households expecting no inflation is broadly in line with the predictions of ADP. Similarly, we can check the proportion of U.S. and Swedish households who underpredict inflation as a function of realized inflation (figures 8 and 9), and again, we observe a striking difference between the two nations. In the United States, the proportion of households underestimating inflation is negatively related to inflation, in direct conflict with the predictions of ADP near-rationality. However, in Sweden, the proportion of households under-predicting inflation rises appreciably as inflation falls under 3 percent, again, seemingly consistent with the predictions of the ADP framework. However, at rates of inflation greater than 5 percent, the under-prediction of inflation by Swedish households rises again, which is hard to reconcile with their model. Thus, we have shown that the evidence in aggregate survey data is generally unsupportive of near-rationality, both in the United States and in Sweden. In the U.S. microdata we find further evidence against near-rationality, whereas the Swedish microdata seem more supportive of ADP-type near-rationality. In order to disentangle this seeming contradiction, we believe a more thorough understanding of the distributional characteristics of household inflation expectations is in order. Specifically, how are inflation expectations distributed across households and in what ways is that distribution related to the realized inflation rate? This is the subject of section 3.
"Focal Points" and the Qualitative Nature of Household Inflation Expectations
Checking The unusual and unexpected congregation of household inflation expectations around certain focal points suggests that households form their inflation predictions in largely qualitative terms. That is, they tend to report inflation predictions that are consistent with no, low, and high inflation, but they do not appear to distinguish between potential minor variations around those rates. We believe this finding is broadly in the spirit of ADP nearrationality-a substantial share of households may not have adequate incentive to accurately gauge the inflation outlook beyond these rather broad characterizations. We refer to this idea as the formation of "qualitative expectations," of which the ADP nearrationality is a particular subset.
To investigate whether these focal points in household inflation predictions are stable 1978 :01-1999 :12 1978 :01-1982 :07 1982 :08-1991 :01 1991 :02-1999 :12 1979 :I-2001 :12 1979 :I-1983 :IV 1984 :I-1991 Note: The proportions reported in the table refer to the proportion of months a particular response is picked more often than the integer immediately above and below it. To save space, we have omitted those integers that never satisfied our definition of a focal point, i.e., 4, 6, 9, 11, and 14 percent.
In Sweden, the same numbers satisfy the definition of a focal point in almost all survey months, with a couple of exceptions. The most notable exception regards the responses in the 1-4 percent range. While 3 percent was the most common focal point in this range during the first inflation regime, 2 and 3 percent are almost equally important in the second regime, and 2 percent becomes the most common focal point in the last inflation regime. This finding suggests that, in Sweden, the announcement of an explicit inflation target of 2 percent has altered the location of a focal point, from 3 to 2 percent.
Another difference from the U.S. findings is that the response of 7 percent does not seem to be a focal point in Sweden. In fact, 8 percent is a focal point during the first inflation 29 regime, whereas 7 percent emerges as a focal point as inflation is reduced. Thus, our findings regarding the stability of these focal points support our speculation that households evaluate inflation prospects in largely qualitative terms.
In figure 11 we examine the distribution of household inflation expectations in the United States in each of the three inflation regimes. Note the recurring concentrations of inflation expectations around 0, 3, 5, 7, and 10 percent. A large share of responses for inflation expectations greater than 10 percent is also seen in the high-inflation regime (when inflation averaged 10 percent.) While the existence of a focal point is unaffected by the inflation regime, the proportion of responses at any particular focal point is clearly related to the inflation regime. The share of households having inflation expectations of 7, 10, or greater than 10 percent falls sharply between the high-and medium-inflation regimes, while the proportions around 5, and 3 percent inflation rise appreciably. As the inflation trend falls further, this time to a low-inflation environment, so do the shares around the higher focal points, while the share predicting 3 percent inflation rises (from around 15 percent to 20 percent). 1978-1982 1982-1991 1991-1999 Sources: University of Michigan's Survey of Consumer Attitudes, and own calculations.
We next examine the distribution of household inflation expectations in the HIP data for the three Swedish inflation regimes (see figure 12. ) We note that, as in the United
States, large shifts from the higher to the medium and lower focal points occur as the inflation trend breaks to lower levels. However, as Swedish core inflation breaks downward to a 2.5 percent trend, the proportion of household expectations around the zero-inflation focal point jumps sharply in a way certainly suggestive of ADP nearrationality. This proportion of zero-inflation responses is nearly three times greater than what we see in the U.S. data, despite the fact that the nations followed the same inflation trend over roughly the same period. Thus, while the Swedish data seems supportive of near-rationality, the observed differences between the two countries instead suggest that the findings are a consequence of a changed policy. 1979-1983 1984-1991 1991-2001 Sources: Statistics Sweden, and own calculations.
One key distinguishing characteristic between the two nations' inflation experiences is that Sweden's low-inflation period has been accompanied by a formal inflation objective for the Riksbank centered on 2 percent. The announcement of this target corresponds to the date at which the HIP-data record a sharp rise in the zero-inflation expectations responses. It is curious that the modal focal point for the HIP data is zero, and not the announced 2 percent inflation objective of the central bank. This may be explained by the observation that while a large percentage of Swedish households understand that one of the Riksbank's main tasks is to maintain price stability (44 percent), only about 22 percent know that the operational inflation target is defined as an annual increase in the CPI of 2 percent. 16 In other words, the Swedish public seems to 
Conclusions
In this paper, we considered the evidence of "near-rationality" in household inflation expectations using detailed survey data. We reject the specific form of nearrational inflation expectations suggested by the work of Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry and are unable to demonstrate several of the key testable propositions of their theory. In particular, the U.S. data seems very unsupportive of near-rationality, whereas the Swedish data is more inconclusive.
The detailed survey data reveal the existence of "focal points" in the distribution of inflation expectations responses, which seems to indicate a largely qualitative character of the way inflation expectations are formed -households tend to predict inflation in discrete terms that are broadly dispersed. While the locations of these focal points appear to be fairly stable across very different inflation regimes, we record significant shifts in the proportion of responses across the focal points when the inflation trend shifts.
Further, we were able to identify a substantial difference between the distributions of the inflation expectations of individuals in the United States and Sweden in the post-1992 period, even though both nations followed nearly identical low-inflation trends.
This difference between the two nations was not evident in the higher-inflation subsamples. Our interpretation of this finding is that inflation targeting in Sweden has substantially increased the proportion of Swedes who ignore inflation. Thus, while our findings for Sweden are broadly consistent with near-rationality we believe our findings are a consequence of a changed policy rather than evidence of near-rationality.
While our finding that households gauge inflation prospects in broad, qualitative terms, is similar in spirit to the behavior posited by ADP, the policy implications are quite different. ADP rests on a behavioral assumption -that households underpredict inflation at low rates. Thus, according to ADP a central bank can exploit that behavior and permanently reduce unemployment, giving rise to a "kinked" long-run Phillips curve.
Our findings instead suggest that the average response may very well coincide with the actual inflation rate. A central bank that permanently raises its inflation trend -in particular if it raises an explicit inflation target -is likely to affect the location of a focal point. However, there is no support in the data that households will underpredict inflation at higher inflation rates. Thus, such a higher inflation trend will not affect the long-run unemployment. We therefore conclude that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical, and that such an attempt to "fool" households will only result in higher inflation combined with higher average inflation expectations.
